Optimal gain/pain sharing in construction cooperation contracts

نوع: Type: thesis

مقطع: Segment: masters

عنوان: Title: Optimal gain/pain sharing in construction cooperation contracts

ارائه دهنده: Provider: mitra mokhtari

اساتید راهنما: Supervisors: seyed mehdi hosseinian

اساتید مشاور: Advisory Professors:

اساتید ممتحن یا داور: Examining professors or referees: javad taheri nezhad, ebrahim ghiasvand

زمان و تاریخ ارائه: Time and date of presentation: 2024/02/05- 10 am

مکان ارائه: Place of presentation: seminar 2

چکیده: Abstract: The use of cooperation contracts in the construction industry for infrastructure projects is one of the ways to improve project outcome; These projects require the cooperation of project agents due to their non-repetitive nature and special conditions. The current research is focused on cooperation contracts, in which the contractor and the designer cooperate with the owner in a joint effort and act towards his goals. One of the topics of interest in these contracts is the issue of outcome sharing among the three groups of key stakeholders, i.e. owner, contractor and designer. Their different levels of risk aversion vary from risk neutral to risk averse. In this research, the optimal mathematical model is presented in two traditional delivery methods and managing contractor delivery methods based on the principal-agent theory and utility theory. In order to verify the mathematical model and the presented propositions, a targeted interview is conducted with experts in this field. The results show that in cooperation contracts in different delivery methods, the optimal sharing ratio of the project outcome share between the contractor and the designer is affected by the risk aversion levels of each party. Allocation of the outcome to the designer is fixed regardless of the delivery method, however, the allocation of the outcome to the contractor is variable depending on the type of delivery method. This study provides recommendations for those involved in writing collaborative agreements related to project outcome sharing arrangements. Overall, this research provides new insights regarding cooperative contracts in the construction industry